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Abstract: The goal of this paper is to specify the nature of the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice 
(MNJ) as a non-state armed organisation and to make sense of its shaky existence since its inception, 
almost three years ago, with a particular focus on the period that made the MNJ a serious political and 
military opponent to the government. Our argument is that circumstantial alliances and percolation of 
grievances provoked by local micro-political dynamics and long-standing disenfranchisement of some 
sections of the Tuareg youth permitted the movement to take off as a credible rebel group. Ultimately, we 
want to verify if existing analytical tools made available by the theoretical literature on non-state armed 
groups are adequate to make sense of the MNJ’s organisational trajectory, particularly considering Jeremy 
Weinstein’s seminal book “Inside Rebellion” (Weinstein, 2006). By putting too much emphasis on 
“initial conditions”, Weinstein’s model, we argue, fails to properly acknowledge the micro-social 
dynamics that shape armed groups and their erratic trajectory, and we stress the need to investigate what 
armed organizations are sociologically made of rather than bluntly postulating their existence. 
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On 9 February 2007, the military post of Iferouane, a northern locality of Niger was attacked by 
a handful of armed men on board of five pick-ups. Three soldiers of the Forces armées 
nigeriennes (FAN) were killed and some military material was robbed. Although of unusual 
gravity, the attack could have been considered as another isolated act of “residual banditry”, as 
Niger’s authorities used to label any pseudo-criminal act perpetrated in the North by suspected 
ex-rebels since the low-intensity insurrection that opposed Tuareg armed groups to governmental 
forces officially ended in the mid-90s. 
Indeed, two of the men that were involved in the attack of Iferouane, known as ex-combatants, 
had also the reputation of being irreducible traffickers operating in the loosely controlled desert 
zone between Niger, Mali, Algeria, and Libya. But unexpectedly, a group unknown so far, the 
Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ) soon claimed the attack and almost 
simultaneously made accessible to the rest of the world a platform of substantial political claims 
and pursued a fine-tuned propaganda through an internet blog, updated on a daily basis
2. 
According to its founders, political and economic marginalisation of the northern populations, 
unequal and opaque distribution of the uranium rent - exploited in the northern mining town Arlit 
(see figure 1 in the appendix) - were the two main reasons why the MNJ was born. 
A few months later, the MNJ gathered more than 1,000 combatants, mostly concentrated in the 
Aïr Mountains around Tamgak (see figure 1). From this stronghold, the rebels proved capable of 
hitting any location of the vast northern Niger desert territory. In parallel, the international media 
exposure of the MNJ progressively mounted, notably in France, the former colonial power. It 
mobilised extensively the image of the noble and nomadic “Blue Man of the Desert” standing up 
against subjugation imposed by central governments, a cliché firmly rooted in French colonial 
historiography. In March 2008, one of the MNJ spokesmen based in France, Issouf Maha, was 
offered the opportunity to give a press conference at the French National Assembly, following 
the invitation of a prominent Green Party MP. Maha accused AREVA, the French nuclear 
champion holding a de facto monopoly on uranium exploitation in Niger, of causing ecological 
damage and of ignoring the interests of the, mostly Tuareg, inhabitants of the North. Initially 
                                                            
2 http://m-n-j.blogspot.com/  
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vaguely articulated, the political discourse of the MNJ dramatically gained consistence. The 
‘residual banditry’ story could no longer hold. 
In mid-2009, one year after this media success, the military situation on the ground was at a 
standstill and what used to be a unitary movement had split into three groups while a fourth one, 
built around an early non-Tuareg military ally and his men, simply vanished. The three 
remaining groups comprised the Front des Forces de Redressement (FFR), the Front Patriotique 
Nigérien (FPN) and the original MNJ. The three fronts’ ideological differences are unclear: 
initial appeals to justice for all Nigériens have been blurred by ethnic claims and what looks like 
narrow sectional interests. Significantly, the President of the MNJ, Aghaly Alambo, has been 
accused of money diversion and denied his leadership by the political cadres of his group. The 
FPN has disarmed its combatants and returned their guns in Agadez while the MNJ has done the 
same in Sabha, Libya. These two events have been made possible thanks to Libya’s intervention 
which led protracted discussions with rebels leaders in Tripoli and materially accommodated the 
combatants heading back home by offering them cash transfers (I. M. Diallo, 2009). Only the 
FFR has not surrendered and keeps denouncing its ancient allies. Its objective very likely 
consists in seeking amnesty for its chief, condemned to death for the assassination of a local 
politician in 2004. As these lines are written, direct confrontation between rebels and 
government’s forces no longer happen and ‘residual banditry’ seems to have resumed.  
In sum, what started as an obscure isolated attack only temporarily mutated into a credible armed 
rebellion with a solid political content and later on unraveled into a hardly intelligible mosaic of 
seemingly separate groups. In fact the oddity here is not the way the movement started nor is it 
the way it ended: as mentioned above, ‘residual banditry’ perpetrated by ex-combatants was 
commonplace in the area for years while Libya’s role in accommodating (or inflaming) tensions 
is another recurrent feature of local politics. The unusual event here is actually the ideological 
depth and credibility that the rebel movement temporarily showed.  
Our goal is to specify the nature of the MNJ as a non-state armed organisation and to make sense 
of its shaky existence since its inception, almost three years ago, with a particular focus on the 
period that made the MNJ a serious political and military opponent to the government. Our 
argument is that circumstantial alliances and percolation of grievances provoked by local micro- 
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political dynamic and long-standing disenfranchisement of some sections of the Tuareg youth 
permitted the movement to take off as a credible rebel group. Ultimately, we want to verify if 
existing analytical tools made available by the theoretical literature on non-state armed groups 
are adequate to make sense of the MNJ’s organisational trajectory. 
 
Categorising rebellions, accounting for armed groups’ organisational dynamic 
Jeremy Weinstein has recently produced a seminal book – “Inside Rebellion” (Weinstein, 2006) 
- taking stock of and rejuvenating the analysis of rebellions and mobilisation for political 
violence along with other contributions by Wood (2003), S. N. Kalyvas (2006) or Collier & 
Sambanis 2005). Going beyond the somehow sterile ‘greed vs grievances’ debate, it opted for a 
micro- and meso-level analysis, focusing specifically on non-state armed organisations, their 
combatants and what makes the former and the latter stick together. In the theoretical chapter of 
his book, Weinstein exposes the core arguments of his thesis: rebellions derive from an 
‘industrial organisation of violence’ through which structural constraints on the rebel group’s 
finance are converted into peculiar micro-level recruitment strategies. The basic logic goes as 
follows: if the rebel entrepreneur can secure easy access to finance (e.g. through illegal 
appropriation of natural resources or external sponsorship) then he will tend to recruit quasi-
mercenaries, i.e. professionals of violence characterised by short term material accumulation 
objectives. If access to finance is lacking, then rebel leaders will favour indirect channels of 
mobilisation based on kinship ties, shared ideologies and, more broadly, what Weinstein puts 
under the umbrella of ‘social capital’. Stemming from this alternative, the recruits of ‘poor’ 
rebellions are likely to be politically relatively more aware and educated than the combatants of 
economically well-endowed rebellions - education standing here as a proxy for low depreciation 
of the future. Besides, in addition to providing an articulated typology of rebel movements, 
Weinstein’s model predicts patterns of violence: opportunistic quasi-mercenaries are expected to 
show a lower degree of loyalty and to be more undisciplined and violent than their politicised, 
activist counterparts. 
Hence what characterises rebellion making according to Weinstein is a top-down, demand-driven 
logic determined by finance constraints, mimicking a firm’s recruitment policy. As a general  
6 
 
approach, applying the firm model to rebellion-making raises some problems. Trivialising 
political engagement into a narrow economicist framework might be one. We will however 
concentrate our critique on one aspect of Weinstein’s analytical framework, namely the idea that 
the nature of an armed group can be determined ex ante by structural constraints. Weinstein’s 
perspective conceives armed rebellion as a ‘plan’ unfolding according to a script which is 
encapsulated in the ‘initial conditions’ that surround the rebellion making project. Since the type 
of rebellion that will finally emerge is structurally determined by access to finance, the profiles 
of the recruits can be known before any actual recruitment takes place. According to Weinstein, 
recruitment is not a process through which rebel leaders’ expectations on their labour force are 
matched together with the hopes that applicants place in their engagement in violence. 
Contrarily, recruitment follows the logic of self-selection: those who join have the characteristics 
required by the structural constraints imposed from the start. 
We argue that viewing rebellion as a ‘planned action’ (Thévenot, 1995) may miss important real 
life processes - such as trials, error, miscalculations due to blurred time-horizon or loose control 
over men and their actions - that actually render the characterisation of a non-state armed 
organisation much less straightforward than what a mere focus on ‘initial conditions’ would 
predict. This also applies to recruitment. Purely demand-driven enlistment may not be feasible, 
especially in the early days of a rebellion: can an armed group in its infancy actually reject 
spontaneous applications? Does an armed organisation fully control its recruitment policy? If we 
answer these questions negatively, one must then admit that the profiles of recruits may have a 
backlash effect on the nature and the trajectory over time of the rebel group. 
Drawing on our observations of the MNJ in Northern Niger, we suggest that rebelling can 
actually resemble a gradual and fragile “bricolage” whose changes can be influenced by external 
forces - notably state repression - and disturbed by internal struggle over power. We also 
observe, following in depth interviews with active low-level combatants in May 2009, that 
joining and defecting are two decisions loosely controlled by commanders, a peculiarity of the 
MNJ that contributes to its fragility and, analytically, contradicts Weinstein’s deterministic 
structural model. Rather than considering ‘opportunistic’ vs ‘activist’ models of violent 
contention as ex ante mutually exclusive characteristics of armed organisations we argue that  
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opportunism and activism constitute, at least in our case, two undercurrents inherent to armed 
struggle, more or less prominent over time according to conditions we will explore.  
To fully acknowledge the importance of unpredictable bifurcations of the movement and avoid 
their  ex post rationalisation by an omniscient eye, we opt for a presentation following the 
emergence, the rise and the relative decline of the MNJ chronologically, making explicit 
reference to the hesitations, questionings or strategic choices that the protagonists may have 
faced in the course of the conflict. 
 
Methodology 
The following evidence is based on repeated interviews conducted in Niger in August 2007 with 
Nigériens officials and non officials directly involved in or sympathizing with the current or past 
Tuareg rebellions, on various levels (as political cadres or rank and file). Among them are 
Mohamed Anacko now Haut Commissaire a la Restauration de la Paix, Mohamed Akotey, then 
Ministre de l’Environnement and Issyad Kato, Ministre de l’Elevage et des Industries Animales. 
UNDP staffers of the Programme de Consolidation de la Paix dans l‘Aïr et l‘Azawak (PCPAA) 
in charge of providing assistance to former combatants of the rebellion that happened in the 90s 
have also been met and followed in their activity in the northern Niger’s main city, Agadez. In 
addition to this field work - partly truncated due to the declaration of a state of emergency by the 
authorities in the Agadez region making interviews impossible in the area - systematic collection 
of local and international press articles has been undertaken. Also, numerous interviews and 
meetings have been conducted among the highly involved politicised Tuareg diaspora in France 
and their French sympathisers active in the civil society. As we will see, this international facet 
of the rebellion is of crucial importance for the itinerary of the group. Finally, to overcome the 
impossibility to work in northern Niger, we traveled to southern Algeria in May 2009 where we 
met a dozen of Tuareg low-level combatants temporarily away from the front
3. Their number is 
                                                            
3 Algeria has been playing a crucial role in the conflict, offering a sanctuary to the insurgents and providing them 
with shelter, supplies (food, gasoline) and opening its hospitals to wounded fighters. It’s not clear though whether 
this attitude was centrally decided by Algiers’ authorities or if it was permitted by local Tuareg solidarity network 
based in Tamanrasset or Djanet. Tolerance towards MNJ combatants was certainly partly instrumental for Algerian 
authorities as, symptomatically, it tended to fade away just at the time when we were there, coinciding with a round  
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not high as we privileged in-depth repeated interviews with them, covering the many dimensions 
of their engagement. We spent one week with them in Tamanrasset, conducting group interviews 
on a daily basis. 
 
The background of the MNJ: Tuaregs’ longstanding multidimensional destitution 
The MNJ was created against the backdrop of Tuaregs’ longstanding social, political and 
economic destitution, a process that started under French colonisation and resulted in recurrent 
armed contestations, the first of them being the revolt led by Kaocen in 1917, in the broader 
context of WWI. In the late 80s, armed struggle resumed, this time targeting the post-
independence centralised regime run from the southern state capital Niamey. This wave of low 
intensity unrest only ended in the mid-90s. 
Formerly ‘lords of the desert’ where they controlled long-distance trade and pastoral activities 
(camels, donkeys and goats), organised in separate nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes under the 
firm grip of a caste of noble ‘warriors’, the Tuaregs lost most of their political hegemony over 
the century following French occupation of the Sahara. The French defeated the revolt some of 
them carried out in 1917 and pursued a classic ‘divide and rule’ policy preventing any further 
mass mobilisation.  
When establishing the administrative structures of the colony, France promoted to offices an 
educated elite mostly coming from the South of Niger and, particularly, from the Djerma and 
Songhay ethnic groups
4. This bias partly stems from the Tuareg communities’ reluctance to send 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
of negotiations conducted under the auspices of Libya, Algeria’s regional political competitor. Actually, one can 
hypothesise several reasons behind Algeria’s tolerance towards MNJ combatants: first Algeria wants to avoid 
political instability to spread among its own Tuareg communities in the Hoggar (around Tamanrasset) and the 
Tassili (around Djanet); second, Algeria needs the support of Tuaregs from Mali and Niger to fight the Islamists - 
now re-branded Al-Qaeda Maghreb (AQMI) - causing political disorder in the region. Finally, there’s a more 
mundane reason: some Algerian military in the zone and the Tuaregs may have common economic interests in the 
highly profitable cross-border business happening in this region (subsidised food, cigarettes from Nigeria, electronic 
appliances, drug, arms and illegal migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa). 
4 An illuminating point of view on Niger’s ethnic groups’ alleged psychological traits and their usefulness for the 
colony is provided by the French colonial officer Maurice Abadie in 1927: “the Djermas are the most intelligent and 
the most active population in the whole Sudan [a colonial territory corresponding to today’s Mali]; they provide very 
good tirailleurs, the best of the colony” (Abadie, 1927, p. 116-117). In sharp contrast, the Tuaregs are presented as a  
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their children from noble casts to school (Rasmussen, 1992). It resulted, at the time of 
independence, in the early 60s, in an alienation of the Tuaregs from state positions (Grégoire, 
2001), reinforced by a demographic disadvantage compared to other Niger ethnic groups 
following a design of state boundaries leaving them scattered over five national territories: Niger, 
Mali, Haute-Volta (now Burkina Faso), Algeria and Libya. Although the figures are contested, 
recent demographic surveys estimate that the Tuaregs constitute a mere 10 per cent of the 
Niger’s population, while the Hausas represent more than 50 per cent of the population and the 
Djerma/Songhay around 20 per cent
5 (République du Niger, 2007). 
This political destitution was paralleled by a rapid economic decline. The livestock of Tuareg 
herdsmen was dramatically downsized following Kaocen’s military defeat (Triaud, 1993) and 
was hit again by major droughts in the 70s and the 80s. Long-distance trans-Saharan trade 
progressively became obsolete due to the opening of new commercial routes (by air or boat from 
the Gulf of Guinea coastal metropolis, see Brachet (2004) and Grégoire (2001)), thus forcing 
large sections of the population to abandon their nomadic mode of production, at the price of 
serious internal hierarchical reversals. Partial abandonment of caravanning and nomadic 
activities meant that nobles and their tributary chiefs, owners of camels par excellence lost 
prestige and political influence over their obliged traditional subalterns, namely the blacksmiths 
(providing them with tools, jewels and arms and singing their praises during social events) and 
former slaves (looking after livestock and performing domestic chores) attached to their families. 
In the new economic climate, blacksmiths as well as slaves had a relatively greater disposition to 
adapt to sedentary activities such as artisanship or gardening and sometimes became 
economically better off than their former masters. 
Another major consequence of economic deprivation was the migration of many youths of 
Tuareg origin in cities of neighbouring countries, Algeria or Libya (Tamanrasset, Ghat, Sabha...). 
In Libya particularly, some of them benefited from the hospitality of Col. Ghaddafi at a time 
when his country was supporting many liberation movements on the African continent (Chad) 
and beyond (Lebanon). Disgruntled Tuareg youths became a welcome labour force in Ghaddafi’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
much less obeying people and their martial ethos is stressed: they are “always armed” and “force is ultimately the 
only argument capable of safeguarding peace and keeping the Tuaregs on the right track” (Abadie, 1927, p. 169).  
5 The rest of the population is distributed among Fulanis, Kanuris, Arabs, Tubus or Gourmantchés.  
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Islamic Legion where they received military training and contributed to military actions in 
various war theaters. They also performed urban activities unknown to most Tuaregs so far or 
participated in cross-border smuggling of cigarettes or Algerian subsidized goods, taking 
advantage of the price difference between Algeria and Mali and Niger and using their deep 
knowledge of the desert to escape Algerian or Nigérien borders control
6 (Ag Ahar, 1990). Many 
of them remained under-employed which earned them the label ishumar (after the French word 
chômeur, i.e. unemployed). Rejecting total cultural alienation, Tuareg migrants of the teshumara 
movement (i.e. the identity created abroad by the ishumar) elaborated an egalitarian, 
revolutionary form of nationalism, spread across the desert through the songs of activist 
musicians, the most famous of them being the Malian collective Tinariwen (‘deserts’)
7 which 
explicitly and powerfully advocated armed rebellion (Belalimat, 2003; Lecocq, 2004). 
Ideologically converted to insurgency and militarily trained by Libya, the ishumar were the 
revengeful vanguard of the rebel movements that formed in the late 80s. 
In the mid-80s, Tuareg activists allied with the son of former and first post-independence 
President of Niger Diori Hamani overthrown by General Seyni Kountche in 1974. They 
perpetrated an unsuccessful attack against the city of Tchintabaraden, north east of Niamey. 
Much more serious rebellious attempts were made in the end of the 80s as democracy was 
introduced in Niger following France’s conversion for multipartism in Africa after decades of 
support to monolithic authoritarian regimes. Social tensions were then mounting. Many Tuareg 
migrants returned to Niger as they were promised some assistance to settle back in the country. 
Default in the delivery of the promised assistance by authorities triggered the anger of some 
youths who then decided to attack a military post in Tchintabaraden. The national security forces 
retaliated forcefully, killing hundreds of Tuareg men and women in what resembled a pogrom 
operation. The absence of serious prosecution against the perpetrators of the ‘Tchintabaraden 
massacres’ in times of democratic aspirations coinciding with the organization of a national 
                                                            
6 Coping in the desert requires a wide range of idiosyncratic competences – of which survival often depend - that 
Tuareg pastoralists learn over the years: knowing the routes through the dunes and the mountains, knowing where to 
find water, where to find wood for the evening’s fire (and knowing which wood to select), knowing how, where and 
when to hunt, how to identify and where to find medicinal plants, anticipating bad weather conditions... This 
specific knowledge is of crucial importance for anyone carrying out long-distance business in the area. 
7 This band, now a popular representative of the ‘world music’ scene, was created in the late 70s by Malian ex-
combatants of Ghaddafi’s Islamic Legion.  
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conference meant to promote a new political deal sealed a political divorce between Tuareg 
leaders and Niamey’s central authorities. 
The rebel project, envisaged before the Tchintabaraden massacres (Casajus, 1995) concretized in 
the early 90s. Its leaders had federalist ideals. A low-intensity guerrilla was triggered in 1991 
that lasted 6 years, causing several hundred deaths. Peace talks only started in late 1993 when 
first military truces were accepted. What was then a unitary movement (the Front de l‘Air et de 
l‘Azawak, FLAA) led by the educated and energetic Rhissa ag Boula then progressively 
unraveled into a confusing subdivision of fronts organised around clanic and geographic 
proximities with no major ideological divergence between them (see figure 2 in the appendix). 
Each front being entitled access to post-conflict benefits as a peace negotiator, the structural 
incentive to factionalise increased. 
In early 1994, the fronts built up a new entity, the Coordination de la Résistance Armée (CRA) 
and re-structured their claims, to be voiced during official peace negotiations in Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso, under Algerian auspices. In April 1995, an Agreement was issued which followed 
three main directions: decentralization of state’s prerogatives to municipalities (communes) 
instead of autonomy of regions in a federal system as originally demanded by the insurgents; 
economic development in the North, and integration and access to jobs of combatants
8. Other 
agreements concerned the personal fate of rebel leaders: the latter were most probably offered 
some substantial cash transfers. In 1997, the last front still operating, led by Mohamed Anacko, 
joined the peace process. Ironically, Mohamed Anacko is now the Haut Commissaire à la 
Restauration de la Paix in which capacity he is currently promoting dialogue with the ongoing 
rebellion on behalf of the President Mamadou Tandja. Rhissa ag Boula was offered a position of 
Minister of Tourism which he held during seven years following the peace accords. Tourism is a 
strategic income-generating activity in the North and a sector entirely controlled by the Tuaregs. 
By being granted this mandate, Rhissa Boula was also implicitly given discretionary powers to 
prevent any insurrectional aspiration to resume in the Agadez region and, one may argue, to keep 
                                                            
8 Integration entails that positions in the security forces or civil state’s bodies are secured for ex-combatants while 
access to jobs (‘réinsertion’) means giving pooled financial assistance to subaltern, non-integrated combatants to run 
a business cooperatively.  
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an eye on cross-border trade: when not used to carry tourists, one obvious way to make four-
wheel drive cars profitable is to use them for smuggling
9. 
Historically entrenched reasons for discontent among the Tuaregs have been numerous and 
multidimensional: economic, political and social. Tuareg migrants experimenting exile in 
Algeria and Libya - where they also acquired military competence - constituted the frontrunners 
of a revolutionary project that unfolded in the 90s. As we will now see, today’s insurgency can 
be viewed as an offshoot of the 90s rebellion due to the poor management of micro-political 
tensions that arose in the post-conflict. Yet, the rebellion that started in 2007 also contains new 
facets. 
 
Gathering support through conditional alliances and the percolation of resentments 
 ‘Finishing the job‘, righting the wrongs: the micropolitics of rebellion resumption 
Amoumoune Kalakoua and (now late) Boubacar Alambo are the names of the two main 
perpetrators of the attack on the Iferouane military post in February 2007. They are both ex-
members of the FLAA where they gained a reputation of brave and determined warriors. For 
reasons still to be clarified, Kalakoua and Boubacar Alambo did not benefit (maybe deliberately 
from their part) from integration nor were they included in the réinsertion programmes, certainly 
too modest for their middle commander rank. In fact, in the post-peace process era, they earned a 
reputation of smugglers and roving bandits (I. M. Diallo, 2004). Boubacar Alambo was reported, 
along with Elhadj Mohamed Ag Boula - Rhissa ag Boula’s brother – to be the main kidnapper of 
FAN soldiers in late 2004 at a time when Kalakoua was jailed. Their purpose was to liberate 
Rhissa ag Boula, sacked from the government and imprisoned after the killing of a local political 
figure, a murder he was accused of being involved in. The FLAA was then re-formed 
temporarily to serve the interests of its chief. Indeed, Rhissa ag Boula was soon freed and, in 
                                                            
9 The Sahara is a very loosely monitored zone of cross-border trafficking. Cross-border trade is necessary to the 
subsistence of local communities as it is mostly composed (in terms of volume) of basic livelihoods, to which gas or 
cigarettes should be added. Highly profitable illegal trade of illicit commodities (cannabis, arms) is also pervasive in 
which Tuaregs play a determinant role as conveyors and drivers (Brachet, 2007) but not as heads of the long-
distance trafficking networks (personal communication with Jean-Luc Peduzzi). The transportation of illegal 
migrants between Agadez and Tamanrasset via Arlit or between Agadez and Djanet via the Tenere desert is another 
widespread cross-border cash-earning activity.  
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August 2005, 500 ex-FLAA combatants, including Elhadj Mohamed Ag Boula, were given 
Libyan protection (and, allegedly Libyan nationality) as part of what seems to be a deal between 
Niger and its powerful neighbour to calm down the demands of ex-combatants unhappy with 
their situation (I. M. Diallo, 2005b; I. M. Diallo, 2005a).  
The 2007 Iferouane attack can be seen as another round of this same process, aiming at 
facilitating the integration of those who did not benefit from Niger’s peace commitments nor 
from Libyan protection: having found shelter in Libya, Elhadj Mohamed Ag Boula did not take 
part in it, unlike his former companions Kalakoua (who had escaped prison) and Boubacar 
Alambo. As put by one of our informants, an ex-FLAA combatant, the idea was to ‘finish the 
job’ under the auspices of figures who only played supporting roles in the previous rebellion and 
were sidelined from preceding integration deals. By doing so, they also signaled some degree of 
opposition to the ag Boula’s clan, implicitly accused of misappropriating the ‘dividends of 
peace’
10. This was confirmed to us by UNDP staffers who also pointed the delay, due to lack of 
funding, in the implementation of the programme of réinsertion and the low amounts of finance 
available for distribution to former fighters. FLAA members in particular seemed particularly 
reluctant to enlist in the UNDP-run programme (PCPAA, 2007). 
The frustration of those left aside from the peace deals was echoed by grievances of some ex-
combatants who actually gained positions as part of the peace deals but suffered from what they 
express as a lack of consideration and marginalisation within their new military corps, illustrated 
by delayed promotions and the use of derogatory language against them. The Forces Nationales 
d’Intervention et de Sécurité (FNIS), a military body meant to monitor desert areas which hosted 
many ex-combatants, witnessed several defections soon after the inception of the MNJ. 
Obtaining the promised financial assistance, getting secure positions and promotions in security 
forces - preferably in a military body mostly composed of Tuaregs - to permit the control of the 
                                                            
10 Inter family gory disputes are also said to have fuelled division between the ag Boula clan and the Alambos. One 
should note that ag Boulas and Alambos are both Kel Tadele, a sub- group of the Kel Aïr, i.e. the pastoralist Tuareg 
groups originating from the Aïr mountains, north of Agadez and near the Algerian border. These disputes might 
have to do with Rhissa ag Boula using his position as a Minister to police the Aïr underground economy, partly 
based on smuggling, for his own benefit. In 2005, once liberated thanks to his brother’s hostage-taking action, 
Rhissa Boula took over the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès social (UDPS), the dominant “Tuareg” political 
party, in another attempt to maintain his hold on the region and pursue a political career. The Iferouane attack 
definitely caught Rhissa Boula by surprise and constituted a blow to his leadership among the Tuaregs.  
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vast northern territory and its lucrative cross-border businesses seems to have been the priority 
motivations of the initiators of the MNJ and their immediate Tuareg followers. This statement 
may also hold for non Tuareg professionals of arms who later allied with the newly formed 
movement: the disgruntled general Kindo Zada, an ethnic Djerma on the run after the kidnapping 
of one of his competitors in the FAN, serving with his men as mercenary in the region (e.g. in 
Central African Republic); the Jeunesses Arabes, an Arab militia suspected of cross-border 
trafficking; the Forces Armées Révolutionnaires du Sahara (FARS), a Tubu militia which also 
fought the national armed forces in the 90s in the far eastern part of the country. All these 
various groups joined the MNJ with dozens of men and light military material (AK47, pick-ups, 
RPGs or landmines). Common military interests hence coalesced around the initiative of a few. 
To these first-movers, the MNJ appeared to be the right place from which some access to 
security-related state’s rents could be demanded and extorted.  
These alliances however show a high degree of instability - as the Weinstein’s approach of 
opportunism-driven rebellion would predict: the Jeunesses Arabes surrendered to governmental 
forces only a few months after rallying the insurgency. The MNJ argued that they were actually 
sacked and accused them to free-ride, i.e. to carry out trafficking for private purposes under the 
umbrella of the rebellion. In early 2009, Kindo Zada disappeared after he was dismissed from the 
MNJ for suspicion of intelligence activities for the government. He rallied very recently the FPN, 
the MNJ splinter group that first decided to lay down arms, through a communiqué sent from 
N’djamena, Chad - certainly to show his good inclination toward peace
11.  
Certainly the biggest blow to the MNJ’s cohesion was the creation, in March 2008, of a dissident 
Tuareg front, the Front des forces de redressement
12, whose sole purpose was to permit a return 
of Rhissa ag Boula to the front stage. As an ex-chief of the rebellion, Rhissa ag Boula could not 
reasonably pledge allegiance to his former military subordinates while the inglorious episode of 
his liberation from jail following the hostage-taking action led by his brother alienated him from 
governmental support. Creating his own front was then the sole tractable option Rhissa ag Boula 
had to salvage his political existence. By doing so he seriously undermined the MNJ’s capacity 
to speak with one voice. 
                                                            
11 See http://xrl.in/3ppp. 
12 http://redressement.unblog.fr/  
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The strong personalities and their armed affiliates that composed the multiple commanding heads 
of the MNJ certainly do not share any mechanical sense of solidarity. Their behaviours are 
guided by shifting instrumental loyalties, a phenomenon observed elsewhere in the region (see 
Debos, 2008, on Chad). These groups have heterogenous objectives and time horizons and, 
punctually, decide to act together
13. They share some features with Hobsbawm’s seminal ‘social 
bandits’: they are not anti-social criminals; they do indeed constitute one dimension of social 
order as extra-legal actors and might contest the authorities violently if they feel they have been 
treated unjustly; they then attempt to “right the wrongs”. They are the ones, within a community, 
brave enough “to say no”. Their political agenda generally does not go beyond this assertion of 
opposition
14 (Hobsbawm, 2000). 
Importantly however, this characterisation of the MNJ as a complex of outlaws does not apply so 
systematically to its later developments. 
 
Building political legitimacy with the help of international expertise 
Two major developments intervened soon after the Iferouane attack: Aghaly Alambo 
(Boubacar’s brother) was asked to lead the movement and a political platform was issued which 
formed the basis of political debate and activism beyond Niger’s boundary and, particularly in 
France, granting the movement a rather credible political dimension. 
Unlike his brother considered as a desperado, Aghaly Alambo enjoyed the reputation of an 
honest Tuareg notable. He too was a member of the FLAA, second in command of Rhissa ag 
                                                            
13 This perspective applies well to Amoumoune Kalakoua who participated in an attack against the Malian garrison 
of Kidal in 2006, giving a hand to Malian Tuaregs claiming better integration in the Malian army. 
14 One may add two other features of social bandits, as described by Hobsbawm, which may apply to our case. 
Hobsbawm stresses that social bandits are sociologically more likely to be found in pastoralist or herdsmen 
societies. Most of the Tuareg leaders of the 2007 rebellion actually originate from the Aïr Mountains where pastoral 
activities are still central to the economy. Another interesting trait of the social bandits evoked by Hobsbawm 
concerns the popularity (mixed with fear) they enjoy among the population and the grand narratives that generally 
describe their feats. Interestingly the most detailed and, strikingly, uninterrupted account we heard during our 
interviews was the epic story that forced Boubacar Alambo to desert the army and become an outlaw: when still a 
military, he had lent his arm to a friend willing to go hunting but the friend did not return the gun. This would mean 
severe punishment for Alambo which is why he decided to collect the gun instead of going back to the barracks. He 
was then considered as a deserter and got chased by the security forces, but cleverly escaped in the mountains, took 
some hostages there, managed to gain temporary impunity etc.  
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Boula in the 90s. He occupied the position of sous-préfet in Arlit, the uranium mining town 
located north of Agadez, and had invested in tourism and had become a prosperous travel agent, 
a lucrative activity he sacrificed to embrace armed struggle again in 2007. The implication of his 
brother in the attack maybe did not leave him any choice. Aghaly Alambo’s installation as the 
head of MNJ significantly improved the initial dubious image of the MNJ. 
The publication of a comprehensive, though eclectic, platform of claims on an internet blog later 
on strengthened the MNJ’s more political turn
15. The movement smartly downplayed its ethnic 
coloration by claiming justice for all Nigériens and denouncing the malpractices of the central 
government. Despite making specific demands for the North, the MNJ took care of making them 
regional rather than ethnic. They consisted in securing more positions for Northerners in the 
army and the civil service (echoing the concerns just exposed above), accelerating the 
decentralisation process and fulfilling the promises of budget transfers to municipalities and, 
crucially, revising the sharing arrangements of the uranium rents extracted from the Arlit mines 
and mitigating the ecological damages and health hazards associated with the extractive industry. 
Uranium extraction in Arlit and, more broadly, in the Agadez region, was an issue already 
present in the rebellion’s discourse of the 90s which however gained a crucial importance in the 
discourse of the MNJ. Crucially, this discourse was not only carried by MNJ’s leaders operating 
in the Aïr Mountains but also, more vividly, by those who soon formed the “political cell” of the 
MNJ, e.g. the intellectual cadres, all based in France, from where the internet blog was also 
conceived and updated. Prominent political cadres firmly played the environmental card to 
publicise their struggle, enlisting French anti-globalisation movements, Green Party officials 
(including the popular MP Noel Mamère) or anti-nuclear activists into their cause. This was the 
result of a deliberate attempt to broaden the media coverage of the conflict.  
Such a wide mobilisation among diverse groups was made possible by the activation of personal 
ties by French sympathisers of the Tuareg cause – often running small NGOs in the Aïr region 
(Casajus, 1995; Grégoire, 2006) - and hosts of exiled Tuareg dignitaries
16. Numerous cultural 
                                                            
15 See: http://m-n-j.blogspot.com/2007_04_15_archive.html. 
16 This strategy has not been systematically successful. Strangely, some associations once at the forefront of pro-
Tuareg activism, such as the Fondation Danièle Mitterand (the charity founded by the ex-French president Francois  
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events such as gigs of Tuareg blues, small political rallies and happenings at the front door of the 
French nuclear giant AREVA - which, until the very recent months, had the monopoly of 
exploitation of Niger’s uranium – were organised
17. A great deal of expertise in environmental 
activism was then transferred from French semi-professional activists to Tuareg activists.  
This communication strategy closely followed, not consciously, the ‘recipes’ observed by Bob 
(2002) about the Ogoni struggle of the late 90s in Nigeria against Shell and the Nigerian 
government. Following Bob, the trinity of smart international activism includes: i) avoiding 
perpetrating violence (notably against civilians); ii) minimising internal divisions; iii) privileging 
environmentalism over nationalism. One could add: directing attention to the multinational 
corporations operating in the country rather than placing the focus on its mildly democratic 
authorities. Most of these conditions have been fulfilled by the MNJ’s ‘political cell’, at least in 
the period of time during which it was particularly active. Anti-nuclear activism went as far as 
prosecuting one head of AREVA’s security for racist comments he made against the Tuaregs. 
The case was prepared by a lawyer specialised in the disputes opposing multinational 
corporations and indigenous communities. It was ultimately lost but gained significant media 
coverage (Le Monde, 2009; Libessart, 2009). 
One should not overlook that the many events aiming at attracting media attention also 
constituted occasions to raise funds for the Tuareg populations of the Aïr and, most probably, for 
the MNJ combatants themselves. Important efforts were also devoted to alert local populations in 
Niger: digitalised material informing on uranium exploitation and its current and prospective 
effects on public health, land ownership etc. was prepared from Paris and sent to Niger to be 
circulated among combatants and the population on memory sticks. Figure 3 in the appendix is 
the most glaring example of these efforts. Incidentally, this shows, contrarily to Weinstein’s 
argument, that external material sponsorship and ideological advocacy can actually go hand in 
hand. 
Our point here is not to overlook the objective problems caused by uranium extraction in Niger. 
Uranium exploitation does pose serious problems to Niger: after decades of opaque management 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Mitterrand’s widow) or the Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l’Amitié entre les Peuples later became much 
more discreet.  
17 For an illustration see: http://xrl.in/3qd5.  
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jointly by the French company AREVA and the Nigérien government, the national authorities 
have decided to frantically allocate hundreds of exploration and exploitation permits to foreign 
companies, completely disregarding the fate of local populations and failing to provide 
guarantees on the transparency of financial deals with multinational corporations (M. Diallo, 
2009). What we want to highlight here is not the objectively appalling conditions in which 
natural resources are exploited in Niger but the way these conditions entered the political debate 
surrounding the MNJ: by gathering external expertise on the, now widely publicised, 
mechanisms of the ‘natural resources curse’ and systematically de-emphasizing other facets of 
the rebellion: ethnic-based grievances and sectional interests such as those carried by the ex-
combatants evoked above. A sanitised version of the MNJ then emerged between mid-2007 and 
2008 and one may hypothesise that Parisian activism of the ‘political cell’ and its French 
sympathisers affected operations on the ground: limited military actions have been undertaken at 
a time when the MNJ could have pushed its tactical military advantage further, at the cost of 
raising impatience among the fighters but also among the most nationalist of the Tuareg cadres
18.  
 
“Joining Tamgak”, the liberating experience of the ishumar 
In addition to disgruntled professionals of arms seeking privileges and to activists of the diaspora 
striving to instil political content in the movement, the MNJ is composed of at least one more 
stratum of militants: the so-called ishumar, generally enlisted as rank-and-file. We met some of 
them in Tamanrasset in May 2009. 
These low-level combatants did not join the MNJ immediately after its creation. Most of them 
joined after August 2007, i.e. six months after the official birth of the movement. Unlike the 
initiators and early joiners of the 2007 rebellion, these combatants are not ex-combatants of the 
90s rebellion. They are youths of Agadez and Arlit who thought the situation was ripe for them 
to join. In Tamgak, the headquarter of the MNJ in the Aïr mountains, they lived the life of 
combatants for the first time. 
                                                            
18 Symptomatically, as we were attending one of the Parisian events debating the situation in Northern Niger, we 
witnessed a serious verbal dispute between a French left-wing activist, expert of the ‘Françafrique’ – i.e. France’s 
ambiguous relations with African dictatorships -, and one prominent Tuareg activist, the former blaming the latter 
for being publicly too vocal about the racial dimension of the conflict.  
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Although it’s hard to find any particular event that ultimately decided them to join, the infamous 
and gory killing by the army of three old men in Tezirzeit, a locality in the Aïr, in May 2007 (see 
the poem in homage to the victims in the appendix)
19 and the other exactions perpetrated by the 
Forces Amées Nigériennes were often quoted as the signal they needed to finally join Tamgak
20. 
They could also perfectly see the tension rising in the years preceding the outbreak of violence: 
one other immediate factor behind their enlistment is the huge new Imouraren extractive 
complex allocated to AREVA and the will of many locals not to be excluded from the deal this 
time, contrarily to what happened in the 70s when AREVA settled in Arlit and recruited most of 
its skilled labour force in Niamey, the far away state capital
21. Inhabitants of Arlit and Agadez, 
our respondents continue, also saw numerous Chinese engineers travelling across the desert in 
the years 2004-5, carrying heavy measurement instruments as part of the government’s plans to 
distribute mining concessions. Finally they could perfectly observe that all the peace agreements 
of the late 90s were going nowhere. 
The subjective less immediate reasons behind the Tamanrasset’s combatants’ decision to join the 
MNJ revolve around three interconnected themes: racism, unequal access to jobs and territorial 
sovereignty. The educational trajectories of the interviewees are full of anecdotal evidence of 
open rejection of their Tuareg identity by the teachers or non-Tuareg classmates. These 
discriminatory behaviours were perpetuated after school when these young men sought jobs and 
tried to pass interviews or exams: I was told countless episodes of candidates “not known by 
anyone”, “not born in Agadez”, “not brought up among us”, and, importantly, “not more 
qualified than we are” finally being granted the job they were coveting.  
The feeling of injustice is reinforced by the fact that MNJ combatants consider the northern 
region as their own. This does not just express sentimental attachment. As stressed above, 
Tuaregs have plenty of very practical competences intimately linked to their life in the desert 
                                                            
19 What gave particular resonance to this event was also the fact that one of the victims was Kalakoua’s father. 
20 See S. N. Kalyvas & Kocher (2007) for an interpretative framework linking enlistment of combatants and state 
repression. 
21 None of the dozens of exploration permits granted by Niger to foreign multinational corporations has concretised 
yet, except one, the Imouraren project which will be, in the next 2 years, the second largest uranium mine in the 
world, thanks to €1bn investment. Ironically, this new exploitation site is run by AREVA which, in 2007, conceded 
more advantageous financial deals to Niger’s authorities and, as a result, has been allocated this promising 
exploitation site.  
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which sustain their sense of territorial belonging. The desert is their land and there is a shared 
feeling among our respondents that the Tuaregs are being dispossessed of it. In fact the view that 
Agadez is suffering a second colonisation by the ‘Southerners’ is commonplace in the interviews 
I have carried out, not only in Tamanrasset but also in 2007 in Agadez and Niamey. This brings 
about racial statements: “we’re occupied by the Blacks” - as Tuaregs consider themselves as 
“Whites”. This distinction carries a heavy historical weight since, in past centuries, the sedentary 
‘Blacks’, notably the Hausa, used to live under the Tuaregs’ supremacy who regularly raided 
them and used them as slaves
22.  
Struggling to get jobs, feeling discriminated against, the fighters I met, lived the typical life of 
the  ishumar, made of temporary jobs in tourism and idleness with other non-married male 
fellows consisting of playing the guitar, smoking, drinking and running political debates. Being 
an achamor (singular of ishumar) reflects much more than being unemployed: it carries quasi-
socialist values: ishumar live together, eat together, sing together and share all their belongings. 
They form a small all-male cell of solidarity ties and a space for political debate which tends to 
be self-validating. The music they listen to describes their daily misery, glorifies the desert, 
celebrates friendship ties and urges them to stand up
23. The stigma of being unemployed has 
somehow been transformed into a pride. Crucially, our point is that the teshumara represents an 
alternative lifestyle which is very adequate for warlike purposes
24.  
What does “going to Tamgak” or “exiting” (sortir) mean in this context? We suggest that it 
implies the extension of the teshumara lifestyle at a full scale with the additional satisfaction that 
one, at least in theory, contributes to political change. By enlisting, ishumar make something 
collectively useful: “we assert our culture and we make it advance at the same time”. Such a 
statement brings us rather far from the standard collective action puzzle and moves the logic 
closer to what Wood called “the pleasure of agency” (Wood, 2003). Fear of exposing one’s life, 
sacrifice, military discipline and obligations are obviously present but what the militants insisted 
                                                            
22 The racial dimension of MNJ combatants’ discourse is echoed in a video one can buy in Tamanrasset’s or 
Djanet’s music and DVD shops: in parallel with the celebration of MNJ fighters’ courage, it shows their reactions 
immediately after they destroyed a convoy of the Forces armées nigériennes, which are replete with racist allusions. 
23 This is what Tinariwen songs are about. Note that Tinariwen is just one band among many other, very prolific 
adnd talented, Tuareg musicians. 
24 It actually recalls the lifestyle of some of the radical left’s groups of the 70s in Europe or in the US, such as the 
Weathermen (Sommier, 2008).  
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on was the joy of joining their Agadez friends - sometimes after days of lonely walk in the desert 
- and the liberating experience that being in Tamgak represented for them. Rebelling is not just 
about obtaining more from central authorities (political representation, jobs, access to uranium 
rents), it is also about promoting a different social model, which draws on a revisited Tuareg 
identity. 
Joining and staying for a while in Tamgak is about “learning”, “living an adventure” much more 
than obeying orders and being under the command of military chiefs. Discipline in Tamgak is 
pretty loose. Formally, new recruits seal their loyalty to the group by swearing on the Quran
25; 
then their military abilities are tested. They receive a military rank but the gesture is “more a 
public display of respect than a real military rank”. The fighting community, like the urban 
collective of ishumar is seen as an egalitarian group: rewards are banned because – as I was told 
– “a reward is a division”. Importantly, this point should be mitigated by the fact that arms are 
selectively distributed to combatants, on the basis of ‘merits’. 
Defecting is permitted and not necessarily associated with the betrayal of the cause. Intelligence 
with the enemy may be suspected but “if you betray us, that’s a problem between you and your 
consciousness”
26. The leadership is respected but not blindly worshipped. The fact that some of 
the leaders might have opportunistic agendas is fully acknowledged but this does not cast a 
shadow of doubt on the ishumars’ own motives to enlist as decisions are primarily the outcome 
of individuals’ internal deliberations: “everybody has to do his own revolution”; “the leaders just 
did the first step”.  
According to the Tamanrasset militants’ accounts, the MNJ looks like a ‘hop on – hop off’ 
rebellion loosely controlled by their chiefs. The interviewees might have exaggerated the role 
their agency played in the process of enlistment they reported to me. Yet their detailed personal 
stories do show a high degree of reflexivity and stress that no one, except a few friends (i.e. 
chosen social relations), needed to be consulted to decide whether or not to join. In addition, the 
                                                            
25 Dandois & Creisson (2008) mention that recruits’ oath is threefold: they promise to obey their chiefs, to never 
attack civilians nor to loot (p. 143).  
26 This principle strikingly contrasts with the norm that prevailed in many Latin American insurgencies where 




military structure they describe hardly resembles the neat hierarchical outfit that an “industrial 
organization of violence” would suggest. 
Conclusion: the MNJ as the temporary coalescence of heterogeneous sectional interests 
The empirical evidence exposed above shows the intrinsic ambivalence of the MNJ as an armed 
group. The first-movers, composed of opportunistic professionals of violence, have been joined 
by politicized activists giving advice from abroad and youths carrying out their “own revolution” 
and deeply moved by a revisited ‘Tuareg’ ethos encapsulated in the teshumara movement. The 
activists of the Diaspora gained prominence several months after the movement started and, as 
intellectuals, are favorably positioned to lead peace negotiations with the government, under the 
control of those who still detain arms. Some ishumar may gain modest material advantages and 
resume their lives as before. These heterogeneous groups only temporarily united their forces, 
forming an organizational complex that hardly resembled a neat military structure. 
Where to situate the MNJ in Weinstein’s typology hence seems quite undecidable. Blatantly, 
narrow categories of ideology and opportunism coexisted in the MNJ, in sharp contrast with 
Weinstein’s exclusive categorisation. By putting too much emphasis on “initial conditions”, 
Weinstein’s model, we argue, fails to properly acknowledge the micro-social dynamics that 
shape armed groups and their erratic trajectory: alliances at the top of the movement might be the 
results of exceptional micro-political circumstances; full control of recruitment might not be 
feasible, particularly in the early stages of a rebellion; the sociological content of waves of 
would-be combatants varies over time, following the unfolding of the conflict itself; 
“intellectuals” might jump in the process, shifting the rebel agenda away from the initial 
objectives of the first-movers. While not articulating a model making sense of this dynamic, our 
contribution does stress the need to investigate what armed organizations are sociologically made 
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Figure 1: Map of the region indicating the strategic localities quoted in the text 
 
Source: Google Earth  
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Figure 2. The process of factionalisation of the rebellion in the 90s 
 
Source: http://tuaregs.free.fr/touareg_f/pages/dossiers/organi_niger.htm  
28 
 
Figure 3. Uranium exploration or exploitation permits granted by the government (April 2007) 
 
Source: (Tchinaghen, 2008), p. 9; Ministère des Mines et de l’Energie du Niger  
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Celebrating the martyrs, galvanising the troops. Anonymous song, in homage to Tezirzeit 
victims 
Quand nous avons libéré Tezirzeit, moi et mes frères, en partant nous avions mal 
à l’âme et mal au plus profond de nous ! 
 
Les armes lourdes et légères ont secoué les positions ennemies, ces mêmes 
ennemis qui avaient martyrisé nos parents et massacré leurs animaux 
 
Sous notre puissante conviction et notre soif de justice, les combattants de 
l’armée du Niger se sont rendus 
 
Ils n’ont pas pu résister car nous avions une cause, eux n’avaient seulement qu’un 
ordre ! 
 
Quelle souffrance ! Quel mal être ! 
 
Quand nous avons découvert la fosse où ils avaient enterré nos parents, morts en 
martyrs! 
Source: m-n-j.blogspot.com 
 
 
 
 
 